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Imprecise Probability and Chance
Anthony F. Peressini
Philosophy Department, Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Abstract: Understanding probabilities as something other than point values
(e.g., as intervals) has often been motivated by the need to find more
realistic models for degree of belief, and in particular the idea that degree of
belief should have an objective basis in “statistical knowledge of the world.” I
offer here another motivation growing out of efforts to understand how
chance evolves as a function of time. If the world is “chancy” in that there are
non-trivial, objective, physical probabilities at the macro-level, then the
chance of an event e that happens at a given time is <1 until it happens. But
whether the chance of e goes to one continuously or not is left open.
Discontinuities in such chance trajectories can have surprising and troubling
consequences for probabilistic analyses of causation and accounts of how
events occur in time. This, coupled with the compelling evidence for quantum
discontinuities in chance’s evolution, gives rise to a “(dis)continuity bind” with
respect to chance probability trajectories. I argue that a viable option for
circumventing the (dis)continuity bind is to understand the probabilities
“imprecisely,” that is, as intervals rather than point values. I then develop
and motivate an alternative kind of continuity appropriate for interval-valued
chance probability trajectories.

1 Introduction
Understanding probabilities as something other than points,
perhaps as intervals or more general sets, has often been motivated
by the need to find more realistic models for degree of belief, and in
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particular the idea that degree of belief should have an objective basis
in “statistical knowledge of the world” (Kyburg 1999, 2). I offer here
another motivation growing out of efforts to understand how chance
evolves as a function of time. If the world is “chancy” in that there are
non-trivial, objective, physical probabilities at the macro-level, then
the chance of an event e that happens at a given time is <1 until it
happens. But whether the chance of e as a function of time, Pe(t),
continuously approaches 1 or not is left open. Discontinuities in Pe(t)
have surprising and troubling consequences for probabilistic analyses
of causation and our understanding of how events occur in time. This,
coupled with the compelling evidence for quantum discontinuities in
chance’s evolution, gives rise to a “(dis)continuity bind” with respect to
chance probability trajectories. I argue that a viable option for
circumventing the (dis)continuity bind is to understand the
probabilities “imprecisely,” that is, as intervals rather than point
values.
Imprecise (non-point-valued) probability has been studied for
some time in applied and subjective probability settings, e.g., Walley
(1991), Kyburg (1999) and Weichselberger (2000), and are of
renewed interest of late; see Augustin et al. (2014). And most recently
imprecise probabilities have been extended to objective
understandings of chance by Glynn (2014). While within the setting of
point probabilities the pull toward and away from continuity does
indeed constitute a bind, this is not so in imprecise probability
settings.
The advantage of interval-valued probability is that the notion of
a continuous function opens up when the function in question is not a
point-valued function. It turns out that there are multiple ways to
generalize the standard (point-valued) definition of continuous. Thus
one can find kinds of continuity that stabilize causally salient inequality
claims between probability trajectories without being so restrictive as
to decide substantive philosophical questions by definition. In
particular, such kinds of continuity retain the possibility of “jumps” in
chance to capture quantum or other theoretically motivated
“discontinuity.”
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The plan of the paper will be to begin by introducing chance
probability trajectories and the (dis)continuity bind they give rise to
(Sects. 2, 3). I then present (Sect. 4) interval-valued trajectories as
an alternative to point-valued trajectories. Finally, I develop and
motivate an alternative kind of continuity (Sect. 5), appropriate for
interval-valued chance trajectories, that I argue alleviates the bind
(Sect. 6).

2 Chance as a Function of Time: Continuous or
Discontinuous?
To introduce the continuity question I will present it in a vague
causal setting, which I will firm up and connect to specific accounts
below in Sect. 3. Let x and y denote token events, where x takes place
at time and place (tx, sx) and y takes place at (ty, sy). Suppose further
in some plausible way that x’s being Xcausedy’s being Y, where x is of
type X and y is of type Y. The focus for now will be on how the chance
of token event y’s being Y evolves between tx and ty, that is, how the
chance of y’s being Y changes as a function of time. (From here on I
will abbreviate the token events of “x being X” and “y being Y” by just
writing the properties exemplified, X and Y, respectively.)
It is a starting assumption for what follows that chance be
understood as a single-case time-dependent probability akin to what
are sometimes called “physical probabilities.” I begin with the standard
assumption for such discussions that the chance probability function P
is part of a probability space triple < Ω, ℱ, 𝑃 >where Ω is a set, ℱ is a σfield over Ω, and P is a probability function on F ℱ that obeys the
standard (Kolmogorov) axioms of the probability calculus. These
physical probabilities (chances) apply to particular events, ones that
occur or fail to occur at a particular time and place, and hence have
values defined relative to a time of evaluation. To make explicit the
temporal index, t, involved in evaluating the chance of event Y∈ ℱ at
time t, I use the notation PY(t). Thus in general if an event Y occurs at
a time ty, PY(t) is strictly between 0 and 1 prior to ty, and 1 at time ty
and all later times. I will use the terms “chance trajectory” and
“probability trajectory” interchangeably to refer to chance analyzed in
terms probability in this way.1
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I am roughly following Ismael (2011, 419–420) with my pretheoretic understanding of chance, taking it to be “...the link between
the fundamental level of physical description in quantum mechanics
and the measurement results that mark the points of empirical contact
between theory and world.” I follow her in that my understanding is
that chance is objective and non-trivial (not everywhere zero or one),
though I remain agnostic with respect to her ultimate analysis of it and
especially whether its grounding is at the quantum level or some
higher level as in Glynn (2010, 2014) or Sober (2010).
To illustrate a chance probability trajectory further, consider the
following commonly discussed example originally from Rosen (1978)
and modified here from Eells (1991):

Example 1
A poorly putted golf ball is rolling roughly in the direction of the cup
when a squirrel runs by and bumps it in such a way that its resulting
trajectory is directly toward the cup and it continues right into the cup.
Again, I am assuming that the probability values of PY(t) in this
example reflect the objective chance of the event (ball going in the
hole) and that its chance is strictly <1 until it happens. To fill out the
relevant probabilities in this example, suppose that the probability of
the ball going into the cup given its initial trajectory, velocity, etc. is
0.4. Suppose further that, in general, the (type) probability of balls
going in when squirrels bump them is very low (say 0.05), however, in
this (token) case the particular trajectory of the ball immediately
following the bump made the probability of the ball falling in the cup
likely, say 0.8. Denoting the event of the squirrel bumping the ball as
x being X and the event of the ball going into the cup as y being Y, we
can depict the probability trajectory of Y as in the graph in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1
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Chance trajectory with discontinuous jump at occurring event

The usual (intuitive) causal verdict in this example is that the
squirrel’s kick X caused the ball to drop into the cup Y, even though in
general squirrel kick’s in such situations almost never result in the ball
going in the hole. The salient features of the graph for causal
considerations are that the chance of Y takes an immediate point drop
in probability at tx, corresponding to the type-level fact that X-type
events generally decrease the chance of Y-type events, and that the
chance of Y recovers immediately after the ball is bumped at tx to a
higher value than it had before because of the favorable
trajectory/velocity actually imparted by the token event X. While
hopefully this causal story seems plausible enough, its details are not
of particular concern here. For present purposes, the important feature
of the graph is the discontinuity at ty, that is, the fact that the chance
of Y “jumps” to 1 at moment the ball falls into the cup.2
This “jump” is perhaps a natural way to incorporate the
assumption that the world is chancy or indeterministic at the macrolevel. This “occurring event discontinuity” assumption is made and
discussed explicitly in, for example, Eells’ (1991, 294) account of
singular causation, but the question arises in any setting in which
probability trajectories and chance are involved. I refer to this
assumption as
DJP (Discontinuous Jump Principle) The chance trajectory
of an event e that occurs at te jumps discontinuously to 1 at
time te.
It is important to note that in order for there to be a
discontinuous jump (jump discontinuity) as Y occurs (or at any other
significant time, e.g., tx), it is necessary that the trajectory be
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continuous in some (perhaps small) interval to the left of the jump
discontinuity—this will become significant below.
Notice that the assumption that the probability of an event is
not one until the event occurs is also consistent with the graph
continuously approaching one. While it may be more natural to require
the graph to “jump” to one, this “jump” is not entailed by a chance or
indeterminism assumption.4 Consider the alternate graph of Example
1 depicted in Fig. 2, in which the chance trajectory continuously
approaches one at ty. It is equally true in this graph that the
probability of Y is strictly <1 until it actually occurs at ty. The
difference between this graph and the graph in Fig. 1 is that in Fig. 1
the value of PY(t) is bound away from one prior to ty, while in Fig. 2
the value of PY(t) becomes arbitrarily close to, but always <1 as t
approaches ty.

Fig. 2
Chance trajectory with continuous chance at occurring event

This question of the continuity of the chance trajectory of an
occurring event is but one of a host of issues that come up concerning
the continuity of chance trajectories. In the next section I argue that
these general continuity issues have no straightforward resolution and
in fact present something of a bind.

3 The Continuity Bind
In this section I argue that there are compelling reasons both
for and against the possibility of discontinuities in chance trajectories,
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and that consequently we are faced with a “continuity bind.” The bind
arises from the tension between the following three considerations: (1)
systematic discontinuities in chance trajectories like those required by
DJP are problematic, but (2) assuming continuous chance trajectories
runs afoul the compelling evidence for discontinuous chance from
quantum phenomena, and yet (3) many probabilistic accounts of
causality depend in one way or another on continuity assumptions.

3.1 Discontinuity Problems
Return now to Example 1. Consider the period from after the
time the squirrel bumps the ball to the time it enters the cup. The
instant the ball comes off the bump it has a certain trajectory and
speed, one that will take it directly into the cup, and this helps make
the chance of the ball going in as high as it is after that instant. As
time gets closer to ty and the ball gets closer to the cup, the number of
eventualities that could prevent the fall into the cup decreases, and
hence its chance continues to increase. That is, as the ball passes by
points on the green closer and closer to the cup with the same
favorable trajectory and speed, the chance of its going in the cup
would naturally be expected to continue to get closer and closer to
one. These considerations alone would seem to favor a continuous
increasing of PY(t) toward one, but there are more compelling reasons
for rejecting the discontinuous version.5
Suppose that DJP is correct, namely, that the chance
trajectories for events that occur do jump at the instant they occur. It
follows then that the chance trajectory for any of the occurring events
leading up to the event under consideration would also have a jump
discontinuity at the time at which they occur. It is clear that the
chance (trajectory) of the original event is not independent of the
chance (trajectories) of certain of the events leading up to it, i.e., its
chance depends on those events that need to “fall into place” in order
for it to happen. And this leads to problems. Consider again Example
1: between the time of the cause-event tx and the time of the effectevent ty, both version’s graph (Figs. 1, 2) depict the chance trajectory
as continuous in the interval just to the left of ty. But this does not
accord with the “jumpy” nature of the probabilistically (causally)
relevant prior events falling into place.6 If all the events involved in
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the ball traversing the points on the green after being bumped and
before entering the cup have chance trajectories that have a jump
discontinuity at the time they occur, then it seems that the chance
trajectory of Y (ball falling into the cup), which depends upon such
events falling into place, should reflect this discontinuous “jumping” at
the times these prior events occur in the interval before ty.
This reasoning suggests that the discontinuous version of how
chance trajectories increase to one is inconsistent with the chance
trajectory PY(t) being continuous in the interval just before ty, as it
must be in order to have a jump discontinuity. If this is right, then
assuming something like DJP in such settings is inconsistent, since
PY(t) is required (as depicted) to be continuous in at least some small
interval to the left of ty. The details of the formal argument and
discussion can be found elsewhere (Peressini forthcoming), so I will
just sketch it here. It begins by constructing a series of
probabilistically relevant events “converging” to the time ty, the
moment Y occurs. Consider a sequence of moments {ti}converging to
ty and a sequence of events {Xi}occurring at these times and upon
which Y’s chance (probabilistically) depends: in the setting of Example
1, these events and moments might be where the ball was (with its
same favorable trajectory) at half of a second before it went in, and a
fourth of a second before, an eighth of a second before, .... More
1

formally we might put this as 𝑡1 = 𝑡𝑦 − 2ⅈ and Xi= the event of the ball
being where it was at ti with the particular favorable trajectory it had.7
One then makes use of Bayes’ Theorem to formalize how Y’s chance
trajectory is dependent on the chance trajectories of the Xi. The
argument takes the form of an inconsistent/incoherent dilemma,
namely that DJP in this setting entails either that
1. the chance trajectory, PY(t) is discontinuous from the left at ty
(has no left hand limit), which is inconsistent with there being a
jump discontinuity at ty, or that
2. the certainty (distance chance is from 1) of antecedent events
upon which Y depends becomes arbitrarily larger than the
certainty of Y itself, which will be shown to be an incoherent
result.
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The relevant detail for purposes here is that employing a
discontinuity principle like DJP has the unexpected consequence that
chance trajectories are radically discontinuous or otherwise incoherent.
A related result is that employing something parallel to the DJP in
analyzing causation, i.e., utilizing discontinuous jumps as in the graphs
of Example 1 whenever causally relevant events fall into place is
similarly problematic. I will call this causal version of DJP:
CDJP

(Causal Discontinuous Jump Principle) The chance
trajectory of an event e that occurs at te jumps
discontinuously at times when events causally relevant to
e occur.

It should be clear that CDJP runs the risk of the same problems
as DJP. If a similar construction of a sequence of temporally
converging probabilistically relevant antecedent events can be found,
then CDJP will face the same inconsistency/incoherency.8
In summary, while it seems natural in some causal contexts to
understand the chance of an event as discontinuously “jumping” as its
cause(s) occur, such discontinuities lead to problems: when jump
discontinuities are required in general as occurring events occur (DJP)
or as causally relevant events occur (CDJP), then chance functions will
suffer from the essential or radical discontinuity problems (or be
incoherent). But it would be rash to rule out such discontinuity in
general, since quantum theory so notoriously invokes just such
irreducible chance.

3.2 Irreducible Quantum Chance
As mentioned above, an obvious way out of the discontinuity
problem is to understand chance trajectories as everywhere
continuous, but this runs afoul the very real possibility of irreducible
quantum “chance,” both at the quantum level and “percolating up” to
our macro-level.
Quantum events, say the decay of a U-238 atom, may well have
a non-trivial chance of occurring that does not change through time. If
so, then at the instant the event occurs, the chance trajectory will

[Erkenntnis, Vol 81, No. 3 (June 2016): pg. 561-586. DOI. This article is © Springer and permission has been granted for
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Springer does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Springer.]

9

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

jump from its constant value to one. See Fig. 3. Such quantum events
seem to be a singular kind of event that does not depend
probabilistically (or causally) on any other factors, and hence has a
chance trajectory that does not “evolve through time” until it jumps to
1. And while it may be initially tempting to conclude from this that
such discontinuous behavior is isolated to the quantum-level, this is
not plausible. Various examples have been developed to show that this
jumpiness can be made to “percolate up,” even if it does not do so on
a regular basis. A simple one involves nothing more than a Geiger
counter that emits a clicking sound (macro-level event) when a microlevel decay event is detected.

Fig. 3
The discontinuous chance trajectory of a quantum-level event

A possible response might be to maintain that while at the
quantum-level such quantum events have discontinuous chance
trajectories, macro-level events that involve them “dampen out” the
discontinuity. Such a view might insist that events at the macro-level
always have duration; they consist of intervals of time (and space). If
so, then the discontinuity is avoided at the macro-level because the
detection event and/or the ensuing clicking event have temporal
duration during which the chance of the click (detection event) can
increase sharply but continuously to 1. But at best, understanding
macro- and quantum-level chance as distinct kinds such that temporal
duration at the macro-level “smooths out” the quantum discontinuities,
saves only macro-level continuity—and at the cost of assuming a
bifurcated view of chance that involves a significant assumption about
how empirical theory will ultimately go. Countenancing the possibility
of discontinuous chance trajectories at all levels seems unavoidable.
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3.3 Implicit Continuity Needs
How should one understand the continuity of the chance of an
event as the event occurs? The upshot of Sect. 3.1 is that employing a
discontinuity principle like DJP or CDJP has the unexpected
consequence that chance trajectories are radically discontinuous (or
otherwise incoherent). So accounts of causation like those of Eells
(1991) that depend on such discontinuities are immediately
problematic.
But other probabilistic analyses of causation have an opposite
problem: they depend (at least implicitly) on continuity in the chance
trajectories. Accounts most obviously affected by continuity are those
like Menzies (1989), who utilizes “temporally dense” chains of
(counter-factual) probability increases, and Kvart (2004), whose
account looks for “stable screeners” and “causal relevance
neutralizers” in temporally intermediate events between cause and
effect. If chance cannot be assumed to be continuous, however, this
undercuts such accounts by rendering the probability in the interval
potentially unstable in that it may “jump” between values that may or
may not preserve the presence of the relevant “probability increases”
or the absence of “stable screeners” (probability decreasers).9
Even in probabilistic accounts of causation that lack explicit
reference to the evolution of chance through time, there are potential
complications. For example, in Noordhof (1999), Hitchcock (2004),
Northcott (2010) and Glynn (2011) one finds reference to probabilities
(and probability inequalities) assessed “shortly before” the time of the
cause and/or effect.10 These accounts in one way or another compare
the probability of an event e before it occurs at time te conditional on
the presence and absence of a putative cause c at time tc. Depending
on the details of the account, one evaluates inequalities involving
conditional probabilities at moments “just before” the time of the
cause tc−ϵ or “shortly before” the time of effect te−ϵ, and perhaps at
times in between. But such inequalities are stable, that is, one can
safely ignore the ϵ>0 magnitude expressed by “just before,” thereby
assuming that if ϵ is sufficiently small the inequality will hold for all
smaller, only if the probability functions are continuous to the left of tc
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or te. In general, when an inequality of the form Pt−ϵ(e|c)>Pt−ϵ(e|∼c) is
employed as it is in these accounts, its stability is dependent in this
sense on a continuity assumption.
Glynn’s (2011) careful account helps reveal that even when
utilizing variables instead of events for the relevant probability
assessments, there typically remains a dependence on time, and
hence continuity. In my original copy of Glynn’s “A Probabilistic
Analysis of Causation,” he makes use of a “just before” ϵϵ-inequality,
but the version published as Glynn (2011) has removed such explicit
reference to time, opting to express causal conditions in terms of
conditional probabilities of variables attaining a value.11 Nonetheless,
a temporal index plays a role in the definition of Glynn’s (2011)
Revealer of Positive Evidence Set, which is to “include only variables
representing events occurring no later than tE” (p. 358, my italics).
And in his discussion of the “Hiker Ducking Boulder” example, Glynn
proceeds by “interpolating a variable” along the route of the boulder
by which time it is too late for the Hiker to duck (p. 382). That one can
(and must at times) interpolate such a variable defined in terms of
time reveals that the temporal index and its attendant continuity
issues are still present in such accounts despite the use of “variables
attaining values” instead of events with temporal indices.
In summary, if chance trajectories cannot be assumed to be
continuous, accounts of causation may be undercut by rendering the
chance around the times of interest potentially “unstable” in the sense
of jumping between values that may or may not preserve the relevant
features of the probabilistic analysis—typically probability increases in
the presence of the putative cause expressed in the form of an
inequality.

3.4 Neither Continuous Nor Discontinuous
I hope at this point to have made a case for a “continuity bind”
in how one understands probability trajectories in the context of
chance. The above considerations push both toward and away from
discontinuities in chance trajectories; there are pressing needs for both
continuity and discontinuity. In particular:
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•

requiring systematic discontinuities like (DJP) or (CDJP) is
problematic,

•

requiring continuous probability trajectories is too restrictive,
and yet

•

probabilistic causal analyses require some continuity
assumptions.

I now consider how an imprecise account of chance trajectories may
be able to help with this bind.

4 Interval-Valued Imprecise Probability
Trajectories
In section I present the theory of interval-valued functions and
discuss their ordering and continuity properties, which will prove
important in the next section. The idea behind an “imprecise
probability” is that probability ought to be measured by something
other than a point value, and the natural choice is a set of values from
ℝ[0,1]. Often the sets of values are assumed to be closed intervals, as
opposed to more general sets of numbers, because intervals naturally
capture uncertainty with respect to a precise value that is often
assumed to be lurking behind our ignorance.12 Additionally, intervals
have a structure that makes them simpler to deal with than
generalized sets. I too will focus on closed intervals here, though most
of what I will say has a straightforward extension to generalized sets.

4.1 Interval Analysis Basics
My concern here is not so much with issues internal to imprecise
probabilities themselves, but rather with how an imprecise (interval)
framework might provide a needed alternative to point probabilities
with respect to the temporal evolution of chance. Thus, I will simply
assume that there is in the background an account of imprecise or,
better yet, “interval probability,” perhaps along the lines of
Weichselberger (2000). My focus will be on how to think about the
interval probabilities as they evolve through time. To this end, I will
deal primarily with the interval probability trajectory of a given event,
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A as a function, P:ℝ→𝕀ℝ([0,1]) which maps ℝ (time) to the set of all
closed subintervals of the unit interval, defined by: 𝕀ℝ([0,1]) = {[𝑎̅, 𝑎] ∣
0 ≤ 𝑎̅ ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 1}. This allows the results of interval analysis to be brought
to bear, especially Ramon Moore’s pioneering work (Moore 1966,
1979; Moore et al. 2009).

4.2 Ordering Intervals
Deciding on an order relationship in 𝕀ℝ([0,1]) is a problem of
considerable interest, especially in applied settings such as linear
programming and optimization, approximation theory, and artificial
intelligence. The complications stem from the fact that the standard
order relationship on ℝ, “<”, has multiple “natural” extensions to
𝕀ℝ([0,1]). For example, Moore (1966) introduces the following
ordering which preserves transitivity:
[𝑎, 𝑎̅] < 𝑇[𝑏, 𝑏̅] 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝑎̅ < 𝑏.
In addition to transitivity, this order retains the property from < in ℝ
that if A<B then there exists a C such that A<C<B. See Fig. 4. Another
common ordering is an “end point” order:
[𝑎, ̅𝑎] < 𝐸 [𝑏, ̅𝑏] 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝑎 < 𝑏 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎̅ < 𝑏̅
A virtue of this order is that it is weaker than <T and still entails that
each of the end points satisfy the < relationship in ℝ, and it preserves
the property from ℝ that A<A+ϵ for any ϵ>0.
These interval orderings differ from their real counterparts in
that they are only partial orderings as opposed to a total or linear
orderings, that is, ordering such that for all A, B ∈ 𝕀ℝ ([0,1]). either
A<B or B<A. For example, nested intervals such as
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Fig. 4
Ordering intervals with <T and <E partial
order relationships Fig. 4

A= [.2,.4] and B=[.25,.35] are such that neither A<B nor B<A. (See
Fig. 4.) Within applied work in interval analysis, studies of the
properties of different orderings is a lively area (Li and Li 2010; Guerra
and Stefanini 2011).13 For purposes here, the transitive “<T”
generally will be utilized, though again, how to analyze “less than” in
the context of interval valued chance should be considered a “site of
contention.”

4.3 Convergence and Continuity
Convergence and continuity are among the most central
concepts in analysis—and both of these notions depend on the ability
measure distance. Recalling the standard definition in ℝ, for
convergence of a sequence {ai}to a: for every ϵ>0 there is a natural
number N=N(ϵ) such that
|ai−a|<ϵ
for all I ≥ N(ϵ). And a function f (x) is continuous at a point x0 if for
every ϵ>0 there is a positive number δ=δ(ϵ)>0 such that
|f(x)−f(x0) |<ϵ
whenever |x−x0|<δ. The distance function in the setting of real
analysis is of course the familiar 𝐷ℝ (x, y) =|x−y|, which is a special
case of the general notion of a Hausdorff metric.
It is well known that the space of bounded closed intervals 𝕀ℝ
with Hausdorff metric H defined by d(A,B)=max{|𝑏−𝑎|,|𝑏−𝑎|} where
A=[𝑎, 𝑎] and B=[𝑏, 𝑏] is a complete metric space (Aubin and
Frankowska 1990). Thus the closed and bounded subset 𝕀ℝ([0,1]) of
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IRIR is also a complete metric space under the inherited metric
HIRHIR.
In 𝕀ℝ([0,1]) convergence may be defined similarly with 𝐷ℝ replaced by
𝐷𝕀ℝ : if 𝐴 = [𝑎, 𝑎] and {𝐴𝑖 } = {[𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ]} then {Ai}→A if for every ϵ>0 there is
a natural number N=N(ϵ) such that
𝐷𝕀ℝ (𝐴𝑖 − 𝐴) < 𝜖
for all i≥N(ϵ) A straightforward consequence of this definition (Moore
et al. 2009, Sec. 6.1) is that
{𝐴𝑖 } → 𝐴 if and only if {ai)→ a and {ai} → a{𝑎𝑖 } → 𝑎 and {𝑎𝑖 } → 𝑎.
In a like way for continuity, a function 𝐹: ℝ → 𝕀ℝ([0,1])is continuous at
x0 if for every ϵ>0 there is a positive number δ=δ(ϵ)> such that
𝐷𝕀ℝ (𝐹(𝑥) − 𝐹(𝑥0 )) < 𝜖,
whenever x−x0|<δ. Again it is straightforward consequence that if
𝐹(𝑥) = [𝐹(𝑥), 𝐹(𝑥)] then at 𝑥 ∈ ℝ
𝐹(𝑥)is continuous if and only if 𝐹(𝑥) and 𝐹(𝑥) are continuous.
As is the case with point functions in ℝ, F’s continuity at x0 is
equivalent to 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝐹(𝑥) = 𝐹(𝑥0 ) see e.g., Flores-Franulic et al. (2013,
𝑥→𝑥0

1460).
This inherited “ordinary” continuity for interval-valued functions
is so tightly tied to the continuity of the real-valued endpoint functions
that it will not be of use here, since it consequently inherits directly the
ordinary version’s incompatibility with any “jumpiness.” Thus no
additional “maneuvering room” is gained to help work free of the
continuity bind. Fortunately, other conceptions of continuity are
possible. Below I consider weaker notions of continuity for interval
functions that preserve crucial aspects of the notion without entailing
ordinary continuity. This will free analyses based on interval probability
trajectories from the dichotomous continuity of precise probability
settings.

5 Specialized Continuity for IP Trajectories
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Given that different notions of continuity for interval functions
are possible, how should one arrive at one appropriate for IP
trajectories understood as functions of the form 𝐹: ℝ → 𝕀ℝ([0,1])?
Recalling the continuity bind for point-valued trajectories, any such
requirement ought to:
•
•

•

stabilize inequality claims between causally salient probability
trajectories,
retain the possibility of “jumpiness” to capture quantum or other
theoretically motivated “discontinuity,”
not be so restrictive as to decide substantive philosophical or
empirical questions by definition.

That there is no requirement satisfying these three desiderata in
the context of point-valued functions is what gives rise to the
continuity bind, and as we have seen, the inherited ordinary version of
continuity in the context of interval-valued functions will not work
either. Thus, a weaker specialized IP continuity must be found that
allows for the endpoint functions, 𝐹 and 𝐹 to be discontinuous in the
ordinary sense.
At this point there are two general strategies for broadening the
ordinary notion of continuity for IP functions:
1. Focus first on more general set-valued functions (of which
interval-valued functions are a special case) and then apply
such general insights to develop a distinct kind of continuity for
interval-valued functions, or
2. Focus first on the general functional space of interval-valued
functions, and then explore the properties of particular
subspaces of interval-valued functions generated by weaker
notions of continuity.
In what follows, I primarily employ the first strategy, though I
briefly discuss the second in Sect. 5.3.
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5.1 Set-Valued Analysis and Continuity
Once one generalizes functions to entities more complicated
than point-values and their Cartesian products, the ways to theorize
continuity multiply. I next develop an informal notion of continuity
appropriate for IP trajectories and then work out a formal definition of
it utilizing the idea of semicontinuity from generalized set-valued
analysis.
In the early thirties, Bouligand, Kuratowski, and Wilson
formalized the notions of upper semicontinuous and lower
semicontinuous maps on generalized sets with metrics. These two
notions were required to capture the ordinary sense of continuity from
real analysis, because in set-valued analysis, the ϵ-δ formulation,
which requires that arbitrarily small neighborhoods in the range be
mapped into by sufficiently small neighborhoods in the domain, is
independent of the (equivalent in real analysis) formulation that
“continuous functions map converging series to converging series”
(Aubin and Frankowska 1990, 38–40). Upper semicontinuity formalizes
the standard ϵ-δ definition as follows:

Its parallel with the standard ϵ-δ definition should be clear with U
playing the role of the ϵ-neighborhood and the η-ball about x0 playing
the role of the δ-neighborhood. To capture the notion of mapping
converging sequences onto converging sequences we have lower
semicontinuity:
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Again, this definition requires that there be the requisite
converging sequence in Y for any point in F(x0) and any sequence in X
converging to x0.
It is instructive to see how a function may be upper
semicontinuous (USC) and fail to be lower semicontinuous (LSC) and
vice versa. For example, consider
[0,1]
if𝑥 = 1,
𝐹(𝑥) = { 1 1
[ , ] otherwise.
2 2
This is graphed in Fig. 5. It is USC at x=1 because any
neighborhood U about F(1)=[0,1] will contain F(x) for all the x in any
1 1

neighborhood about 1 since 𝐹(𝑥) = [2 , 2] ⊂ [0,1] ⊂ 𝒰 everywhere except
at F(1) which is [0,1] ⊂ 𝒰. And it fails to be LSC at x=1 because there is
1
4

a 𝑦0 ∈ 𝐹(1) say 𝑦0 = ∈ 𝐹(1) such that the elements of a (any) sequence
of xi converging to 1 do not have F(xi) converging to y0—this is
1
2

1
4

because all such 𝐹(𝑥𝑖 ) = ≠ = 𝑦0 . As an example of a LSC function
that is not USC consider
1 1

[ , ]
if𝑥 = 1,
𝐺(𝑥) = { 2 2
[0,1] otherwise.
This is graphed in Fig. 6. It is LSC at x=1 because only
G(1) and every 𝑥𝑖 ≠ 1 has
1
2

1
2

1
2

is in

∈ 𝐺(𝑥𝑖 ), so for every sequence of xi
1

converging to 1, 𝑦𝑖 = ∈ 𝐺(𝑥𝑖 ) is such that yi converges to 2. It is not
USC because the small neighborhood about

1
2

∈ 𝐺(1) given by (.4, .6) is

such that any neighborhood about 1 has an x in it such that 𝐺(𝑥) =
[0,1] ⊄ (.4, .6).
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Fig. 5
Graph of upper but not lower semicontinuous function

Fig. 6
Graph of lower but not upper semicontinuous function

With the notions of USC and LSC in hand, the ordinary notion of
continuity for set-valued functions can then be defined as:

Now once again this ordinary continuity for set-valued functions
is (as intended by its developers) tightly tied to continuity for realvalued functions, in particular, it brings together in the set-valued
context the ϵ-δ definition and the “converging sequences” definition.
So, for purposes here, which involve working out weaker, less
dichotomous notions of continuity, the ordinary conception is
unhelpful. There is now, however, a clear way forward by which to
open up such room, namely, by not requiring both lower and upper
semicontinuity.

[Erkenntnis, Vol 81, No. 3 (June 2016): pg. 561-586. DOI. This article is © Springer and permission has been granted for
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Springer does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Springer.]

20

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

5.2 A Proposal: “Gapless” Interval Functions
With the formal tools now in place to explore weaker variations
of continuity, it will be helpful to reconsider desiderata for continuity
for IP trajectories. First, such continuity should preserve the possibility
of “jumps” in chances because some causal and quantum phenomena
may be such that the intervals representing the chance of effects
“jump” discontinuously. But chance at a given moment need not (and
perhaps should not) be “completely disconnected” from chance
temporally near by. That is, given the interdependent nature of
events, both in kind (causal and constitutive) and level (micro, meso,
macro), chances are not “completely disconnected” from one moment
to another. So while the chance interval of an event evolves through
time, perhaps “jumping” (discontinuously), it should at no point in
time “jump” in such a way that there is an actual gap between the
chance intervals. Call this the:

The idea is to rule out cases like that of Fig. 7 below, while still
allowing discontinuous IP trajectories as in Fig. 8. A bit more precisely,
the idea behind this is that while the chance intervals [𝑃(𝑡), 𝑃(𝑡)]may be
discontinuous, they should not be “jumping” in a way that there is a
time 𝑡𝑥 such that the chance interval at that time [𝑃(𝑡𝑥 ), 𝑃(𝑡𝑥 )]is bound
away from chance intervals at times arbitrarily close to 𝑡𝑥

Fig. 7
Interval function with "gap" discontinuity
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Fig. 8
Interval function with "non-gap" discontinuity

An alternative way of fleshing out the requirement that chance
at a given moment should not be completely disconnected from chance
temporally near by is that there is always an “unbroken” (continuous)
path through the graph of the temporally evolving chance intervals.
Call this the:

In other words, P should not be “jumping” in a way that rules
out the possibility that there could be at each time t in the domain of P
a value ct contained in the chance interval [𝑃(𝑡), 𝑃(𝑡)]such that the
function, 𝑣: ℝ → ℝ, defined as 𝑣(𝑡) = 𝑐𝑡 is itself continuous.
As will become evident below, these are not equivalent
conditions: gaplessness is independent of continuous path possibility.
And as is clear from the graphs of quantum-style discontinuities (Fig.
3), which are not “path continuous” in this sense, gaplessness is the
better choice in order to countenance quantum chance.14
The way to formalize this gaplessness returns to the definition of
set-valued continuity in terms of upper and lower semicontinuity. As
suggested by the graphs of examples of USC without LSC and LSC
without USC (Figs. 5, 6), both of which are gapless in the desired
sense, each of LSC and USC are sufficient for “gapless” continuity. The
proposal is that G(apless)-continuity be characterized as
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It is clear that if F is continuous in the ordinary sense, then F is
G-continuous, and the functions in Figs. 5, 6 are each examples of Gcontinuity without ordinary continuity. As another more perspicuous
example of a function that is G-continuous but not continuous,
consider the following function:
[0.4,0.6] if 𝑥 < 1,
𝐹(𝑥) = {[0.4,0.7] if 𝑥 = 1,
[0.5,0.7] if 𝑥 > 1.
This is graphed in Fig. 9. It is discontinuous in the ordinary
sense (the end point functions are discontinuous) at x=1x=1 and it
also fail to be LSC at x=1x=1. It is however USC at x=1x=1. Notice
also that G-continuity is a generalization of ordinary continuity in that
the point functions in ℝ[0,1] that are G-continuous are precisely the
continuous functions in ℝ[0,1].

Fig. 9
G-continuous but not (ordinarily) continuous interval function

Finally, while G-continuity is sufficient for “gaplessness,” it is not
necessary. There are functions that are not “gappy” but are neither
LSC nor USC. Consider the function:
𝐹(𝑥) = {

[0.4,0.8] if
𝑥 ∈ ℚ,
[0.2,0.6] if 𝑥 ∈ ℝ ∖ ℚ,

[Erkenntnis, Vol 81, No. 3 (June 2016): pg. 561-586. DOI. This article is © Springer and permission has been granted for
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Springer does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Springer.]

23

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

where ℚ denotes the rational numbers and ℝ ∖ ℚ the irrational
numbers. This function (graphed in Fig. 10) is not gappy and there is a
1

continuous path through it (e.g., 𝑣(𝑥) = 2, and yet it is neither USC nor
LSC, and hence not G-continuous. While functions like these are not so
pathological as to to be outside the realm of possible physical theory
(e.g., they are Lebesgue integrable), there does not seem to be reason
from physical theory to be concerned with them at this point. Though
were that to change, there are ways of weakening semicontinuity to
include such functions.

Fig. 10
“Gappless” but neither upper nor lower semicontinuous function

The approach to continuity for IP trajectories developed so far,
G-continuity, began from the more general setting of set-valued
functions. It is worthwhile at this point to examine briefly the second
approach, one focusing on particular subspaces of the interval-valued
function space.

5.3 Interval-Valued Function Spaces and Continuity
When the interval functions 𝕀ℝ[0,1]are treated a function space,
the way is opened to characterize and explore subspaces distinct from
the the subspace of ordinary continuous functions of 𝕀ℝ[0,1]. The
subspaces of interest are ones that both properly contain contain the
ordinary continuous functions of 𝕀ℝ[0,1]but are also still generalizations
of ordinary continuity in the sense that the only point valued functions
they contain are precisely the (ordinary) continuous functions in
𝕀ℝ[0,1].
In this vein, Roumen Anguelov et al. (2006) develops three
distinct notions of continuity: S-continuity, D-continuity, and Hcontinuity that apply to interval functions. The class of S-continuous
functions are of particular interest for IP trajectories as they are the
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weakest of the three. The class of S-continuous functions are defined
in terms of the lower and upper Baire operators, a corollary of which is
that an interval function 𝐹 = [𝑓, 𝑓]is S-continuous if and only if 𝑓is lower
semicontinuous and 𝑓is upper semicontinuous.16 Despite this
relationship to its endpoints functions, an S-continuous function is a
completely novel entity from both algebraic and topological points of
view. Such functions can be quite “jumpy” (discontinuous in the
ordinary sense) with the primary restriction being that the upper
endpoint function can only jump up and the lower endpoint function
can only jump down, and hence do not have the “gaps” of
discontinuous point-valued functions.
The S-continuous functions are strictly contained in the Gcontinuous functions, since S-continuity entails upper SC and hence Gcontinuity. But the example of lower continuity without upper (Fig. 6)
is not S-continuous (its upper endpoint function is not USC and its
lower endpoint function is not LSC), hence the strict containment. One
potential advantage of S-continuity over something like G-continuity is
its connection to continuous functions and the fact that its structure is
well understood and characterizable in ways that make connections to
other kinds of continuity. The class of S-continuous functions contain
the completed graphs of all point-wise infima and suprema of sets of
continuous functions (Anguelov et al. 2006, 18). Also, S-continuous
functions can be characterized as the set of interval functions whose
graph is a closed subset of the Cartesian product of its domain and ℝ
(Anguelov and Markov 2007, 280).
In any case, the generalized continuity work based in functional
analysis offers another viable route for the continuity of IP trajectories.

6 Putting IP Continuity to Work
Having introduced the above more “open” varieties of continuity
for interval-valued functions, I return now to the original motivating
concerns for IP trajectories, namely, continuity questions concerning
occurring macro-level events, quantum discontinuities, and inequality
instability for probabilistic causation.
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6.1 IP Trajectories and Occurring Events
The issue of how to think of the IP trajectory P(t) of event A as
it occurs at time tA raises several distinct questions. The first question
is whether 𝑃(𝑡𝐴 )is [1, 1] or whether it is [a, 1] for some 0≤a<1, that
is, whether the value is a proper interval with 1 as its upper endpoint
or whether it is a point interval. A second question is how precisely the
endpoint functions 𝑃(𝑡)and 𝑃(𝑡)converge to their values, since this is
left open by G-continuity. These questions undoubtedly depend on
broader theoretical (and likely empirical) considerations that cannot be
resolved here, but it is important to note how G-continuity can
accommodate various renderings of the IP trajectories of occurring
events.
In the context of the Golf Ball example (Example 1), consider
the following interval-valued chance trajectory of the events, given in
Fig. 11. In this rendering, the upper endpoint function jumps
discontinuously to 1, while the lower endpoint function converges
(from the left) continuously to a value <1, thus 𝑃(𝑡𝑦 ) = [𝑎, 1]for some
0≤a<1. Another feature of P(t) to note is that at tx, when the squirrel
kick occurs, the value of the chance trajectory “jumps”
(discontinuously) to an interval that contains both the limit intervals
from the left and right. An interpretation of this would be, again, that
the instant of the kick “brings together” the higher chance that ensues
immediately after the moment of the kick with the lower chance
associated with the original trajectory up until the moment of the kick.
This rendering and interpretation involve understanding the kick as a
point event. And again, this IP trajectory is G-continuous (at tx and ty)
because it is USC there.

Fig. 11
Graph of Example 1 with IP Trajectory jumping to 1
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Now consider an alternative rendering, one in which P(ty) is the point
interval [1, 1] as depicted in Fig. 12. Notice that at tx, when the
squirrel kick occurs, the chance trajectory immediately “jumps”
(discontinuously) to an interval that again contains both the limit
intervals from the left and right, but it remains “wide” for an interval of
time before (discontinuously) decreasing in size to the relatively tight
interval it is a bit later in time. In this rendering, the kick event is
interpreted as a temporally extended event. Finally, this IP trajectory
is discontinuous in the ordinary sense and still G-continuous because it
is USC at tx and LSC at ty.

Fig. 12
Graph of Example 1 with IP Trajectory converging to 1

It should be clear as well that G-continuity can also
accommodate quantum-style events, namely, ones in which the
probability of A is r until it happens at tA. There is an obvious Gcontinuous IP function corresponding to the situation:
[𝑟, 𝑟] if 𝑡 < 𝑡𝐴 ,
𝑃(𝑡) = {[𝑟, 1] if 𝑡 = 𝑡𝐴 ,
[1,1] if 𝑡 > 𝑡𝐴 .
The function P is graphed in Fig. 13. Under the prevailing
interpretations of quantum theory, such an event is “uncaused” or
“irreducibly probabilistic.” If such events are indeed qualitatively
different from macro-events, as there is good reason to think, then the
IP framework with G-continuity is particularly apt because it provides
multiple ways to formalize the difference, e.g., quantum events
trajectories take on interval values only at the moment of the event,
or alternatively quantum event trajectories are G-continuous but fail to
satisfy the Path Possibility Criterion (p. 17).

[Erkenntnis, Vol 81, No. 3 (June 2016): pg. 561-586. DOI. This article is © Springer and permission has been granted for
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Springer does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Springer.]

27

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Fig. 13
G-continuous Quantum Event

6.2 Causality and Continuity
Recall the “inequality instability” issue from Sect. 3.3, namely,
that many probabilistic analyses of causation compare the chance of
an event e conditional on the presence and absence of a putative
cause c at time t−ϵ “shortly before” the time of the cause and/or
effect. I argued above that this comparison is typically assumed to be
stable, that is, that one can ignore the precise ϵ>0 magnitude involved
in “shortly before,” safely assuming that if ϵ is sufficiently small, the
values of the chances will be “indicative” of the property of interest
(the inequality in this case). But this kind of stability can be assumed
only if the chance trajectories are continuous with respect to time to
the left of tc and/or te.18 For clarity, in what follows I will focus on time
te, but the same follows for time tc or any other point between them.
The general form of the inequality of interest is:
𝑃𝑡𝑒 −𝜖 (𝑒|𝑐) > 𝑃𝑡𝑒 −𝜖 (𝑒| ∼ 𝑐).

(1)

The chances that are of interest are described as being “shortly
before” the time of the putative effect e because at the precise time of
e the relevant chances (conditional probabilities) are trivial. If the
chance trajectories involved are not assumed to be continuous to the
left of te, then the mere fact that the inequality holds at a given time
“shortly before te” is insufficient to guarantee that it will hold (to the
left) in any interval about te. And if the inequality could be “flipping” in
the neighborhood (𝑡𝑒 − 𝜖, 𝑡𝑒 )then it holding at 𝑡𝑒 − 𝜖 is not going to be
decisive for the causal efficacy of c, since such inequality reversing
would undercut the understanding that c was decisive in the sense of
ruling out the possibility of there being further factors that could act as
“stable screeners” or “neutralizer” or “failure sets.”
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It might appear that some thinkers are indirectly working in a
“continuity condition” with respect to such inequalities. Kvart (2004),
for example, supplements the inequality with conditions that
effectively rule out reversals of the inequality in the interval (tc,te).
Glynn (2011) may be seeking to do the same thing by requiring only
that there be the right combinations “increasers” (supporters of the
inequality) and “decreasers” (under-cutters of the inequality) in the
interval (tc,te). But these conditions are intended to make sure (1) is
preserved (or violated) by holding fixed or allowing to vary appropriate
causal background factors. This should not be confused with the issue
I am urging consideration of, namely, that once all of the factors are
included and the inequality is asserted/denied, it is still asserted
relative to a temporal index, whether explicitly stated or not, and that
the decisiveness of the inequality as the “last word” on c’s causal
relevance is dependent on the behavior of the chance functions not
just at a point in time just prior to te but also in a neighborhood
around it—because an interval contains an uncountable number of
points, but a requirement involving a sequential specification of
comparisons (Kvart) or the right combination of increasers/decreasers
(Glynn) can only be effective on a countable (Kvart) or finite (Glynn)
set of points. Only if such a neighborhood exists can one be sure that
the probability of the effect (just before it happens) is higher in the
presence of the cause and that it remain higher until it occurs. Or put
more intuitively, that the probability increase that qualifiesc as cause
has “the last say” in the evolution of the probability trajectory from
some appropriate time before the effect until the time it occurs.
As seen above, interval-valued functions can provide an
alternative to requiring ordinary (overly strong) continuity. Consider
the properties of inequalities like (1) in the context of G-continuous IP
trajectories. Making use of the transitive interval ordering <T, notice
that for interval-valued G-continuous functions, F and G, the inequality
𝐹(𝑥0 ) > 𝑇 𝐺(𝑥0 ),

(2)

has implications for the behavior of the functions in an interval around
x0. In the case of ordinary continuity, one could infer from (2) that the
inequality holds in an appropriately small interval about x0. While G-
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continuity does not quite support this entailment, it does yield
something almost as strong, namely that
𝐹(𝑥) ≮ 𝑇 𝐺(𝑥)

(3)

in some neighborhood (𝑥0 − 𝜖, 𝑥0 + 𝜖) about 𝑥0 . The proof of this is
straightforward and instructive.
Claim 1w (weak):

Proof
The definition of G-continuous requires that the functions F and G be
either USC or LSC at x0. The four possibilities are (1) both F and G are
USC, (2) both F and G are LSC, (3) F is USC and G is LSC, or (4) G is
USC and F is LSC. The proof for each of these four cases is as follows:
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From this it follows that in the setting of G-continuous interval
valued probability functions, P(e|c) and 𝑃(𝑒| ∼ 𝑐), if the inequality
𝑃𝑡𝑒 −𝜖 (𝑒|𝑐) > 𝑇 𝑃𝑡𝑒 −𝜖 (𝑒| ∼ 𝑐)holds at some time 𝑡𝑒 − 𝜖prior to and sufficiently
close to te, then one has that it does not reverse itself in the interval
from 𝑡𝑒 − 𝜖 to te. That is, the inequality is in fact stable in that it cannot
“flip” in the neighborhood (𝑡𝑒 − 𝜖, 𝑡𝑒 ), and so can be decisive for the
causal efficacy of c.
And further, the stability given by (3), translated back into the
terms of the IP inequality (1) yields that the putative cause c is such
that the chance of e is higher, given c at some appropriate time, and
that it remains at least as high (not less than) for some interval of
time after. This degree of stability is considerably more than is present
in the point probability setting without a continuity requirement. What
is more, as the proof of Claim 1w makes clear, it is the LSC cases
(Cases 2, 3, and 4) that necessitate the weaker result. Thus in order
to obtain the stronger result (>T instead of ≮T), one could require USC
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instead of G-continuity’s weaker “USC or LSC”, and thereby ensure the
full stability of (2) obtaining in an interval about x0.21 This stronger
version would be:
Claim 1s (strong):

Thus, in the IP setting, different levels (strengths) of stability
would be available (depending on the kind of continuity employed)
that could mediate between the particular needs of causal analyses
and the kinds of “jumpiness” (ordinary discontinuity) required by
empirical or other theoretical constraints.

7 Conclusion
I hope to have made a case for the advantages of intervalvalued probability in settings where objective chance trajectories as a
function of time are of interest. In such settings issues of the
continuity of chance trajectories become pressing: discontinuities have
surprising and troubling consequences for probabilistic analyses of
causation and how events occur in time, and yet there is compelling
reason to retain the possibility of discontinuities in chance’s evolution.
In the imprecise setting of interval-valued probability, the notion
of a continuous function opens up, and it turns out that there are
multiple ways to generalize the standard point function definition of
continuous. This yields kinds of continuity that can both stabilize
probability inequality claims between trajectories and still retain the
possibility of “jumpiness” that can capture quantum or other
theoretically motivated discontinuity. And equally important, having
such a repertoire of continuity alleviates the need to decide
substantive empirical and/or philosophical questions by “definitions.”
Footnotes
1. I will assume that the basic form of these chance probabilities is
unconditional; this is in contrast to general probability, which applies
to classes of event and whose basic forms is conditional. I assume this
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for clarity and convenience only: the continuity issues I deal with here
are not sensitive to whether the physical probabilities of chance are
analyzed in the standard Kolmogorovian way or some other way, with
a different conditionalization and/or with conditional probabilities as
the basic form; see for example Hájek (2003).
2. As an anonymous reviewer points out, there are other equally
(perhaps more) plausible ways of understanding the token squirrel
kick’s effect on the probability trajectory, e.g., it might be understood
as “immediately” raising the probability if focusing on how it
“immediately” improves the balls trajectory, or understood as
smoothly lowering it if focusing on the chance of the squirrel collision
becoming more and more likely. But nothing here turns on these
particulars—as long as some sort of discontinuity is plausible in some
setting, which defensible understandings of some quantum examples
provide. The intent of the example here is only to illustrate clearly a
chance discontinuity. The point drop rendering above (following Eells)
is particularly helpful (though not essential) for my purposes because
it exhibits two different discontinuities. I note too that since all most
all (excepting Eells) probabilistic analyses of causation are explicitly
neutral with respect to the continuity question, the mere possibility of
discontinuities needs to be explicitly accommodated or ruled out, since
the possibility itself undercuts such analyses. Both of these points will
be taken up at length below.
3. A jump discontinuity is one in which the left- and right-hand limits
exist, but are not equal. The other two possibilities, that the left and
right hand limits exist and are equal, or that one (or both) fail to exist
are called removable and essential discontinuities, respectively. The
essential discontinuity case will come up again below.
4. Eells, for one, does recognize that chance could also be represented
in a continuous fashion, with the probability continuously approaching
one from below. But he writes that his analysis does not “pay
attention” to whether the trajectory is continuous at the time the
event occurs (Eells 1991, 294, note 6). See Peressini (forthcoming) for
an argument to the contrary.

[Erkenntnis, Vol 81, No. 3 (June 2016): pg. 561-586. DOI. This article is © Springer and permission has been granted for
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Springer does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Springer.]

33

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

5. A possible exception to this might be an irreducibly probabilistic
(point) event, e.g., whether element U-238 will emit an electron by
time t. According to prevalent interpretations of quantum physics this
probability will be bound away from one right up to the instant it
happens, at which point it will “jump” to one. I discuss this case below.
6. I will not distinguish in what follows between causally and
probabilistically relevance. The questions of if and how these notions
coincide is of course at the center of the debate about whether
causation can analyzed probabilistically. For the purposes of this
paper, probabilistic relevance is sufficient, since the concern here is
with probabilistic analyses of causation.
7. It is important to stress that since the argument requires the
construction of a series of events upon which Y probabilistically
depends, it most obviously succeeds when there is a space-time
process leading up to or constituting the event Y, as there is in
Example 1. And as a consequence, the argument does not necessarily
apply to certain classes of quantum events, which (under certain
interpretations) fail to have such probabilistically relevant antecedent
events; this is as it should be as there is nothing incoherent about
such quantum-level examples. While there is debate about whether all
macro-level examples of causation need to have such an intermediate
process, even accepting a pluralistic view, e.g., Hall (2004), it is
sufficient for my argument here that it work for the large class of
macro-level cases (like Example 1) in which there is such a mediating
process. I owe thanks to an anonymous reviewer for help with this
point.
8. I note that CDJP does not give rise to any novel problems from
those that follow from DJP, and in fact may be seen as following from
DJP, since DJP entails that there be discontinuous “jumps” in an
event’s trajectory at each moment its “causes” occur. But while
intuitive, the actual argument to establish this entailment is far from
trivial; see Peressini (forthcoming). Furthermore, it is important to
distinguish between the two principles because the rationales for
introducing each are different, namely causal concerns versus more
general ontological concerns regarding determinism, chance and event
ontology.
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9. Menzies’ account, like Kvart’s, while not explicitly addressing
continuity, does implicitly constrain discontinuities. He builds on Lewis’
(1986) counter-factual analysis in terms of unconditional probabilities.
Menzies requires that causally related events c and e be probabilistic
dependent—which amounts to there being intermediate events
corresponding to any finite set of intervening times between the times
of c and e such that the actual probability of each of the intervening
events is significantly higher than it would have been had the
immediately preceding event in the set not happened. This effectively
requires the chance function to be monotonically increasing, and turns
out to be an implausibly strong condition; Menzies (1996) himself
disavows even an amended version of this theory. As I draw out
below, the point probability framework and this continuity bind often
force one to choose between stability in the chance function and such
overly strong constraints on it.
10. Hitchcock (2004, 414) reports Ned Hall’s suggestion that one
evaluate the probability of an effect shortly before the time at which
the effect occurs; Hitchcock also outlines there a related proposal of
his own.
11. The original version is still available online at
http://web.mit.edu/gradphilconf/2008/A%20Probabilistic%20Analysis
%20of%20Causation.pdf.
12. The term “imprecise probability” traces back to Walley’s (1991)
foundational work in the area.
13. Other prominent orderings are center-point and radius less than,
center-point less than and radius greater than, lower point and center
point less than, upper point and center point less than. See Guerra and
Stefanini (2011).
14. Even if the quantum jump from r to 1 at time ty in Fig. 3 is defined
to be the interval value [r, 1], the function is still not path-continuous.
Were there compelling motivations, there are ways to accommodate
such jumps within a path continuous framework, e.g., by relaxing it to
require only left or right path continuity or by defining P(t) to be [r, 1]
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at ty and all subsequent times, but as things stand gaplessness works
equally well without the complications.
15. For example, one may weaken the definition of Lower SC by
requiring only that one (rather than all) elements in the domain set at
a point have converging sequences. So an interval function 𝐹: ℝ →
𝕀ℝ[0,1]is Weak LS Continuous at 𝑥0 ∈ ℝif and only if there is a 𝑦0 ∈
𝐹(𝑥0 )such that for any sequence 𝑥𝑖 ∈ ℝ and {𝑥𝑖 } → 𝑥0 there exists a
sequence of elements 𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝐹(𝑥𝑖 ) with {𝑦𝑖 } → 𝑥0 .
16. It should be noted that semicontinuity for real valued functions like
𝑓 and 𝑓 is distinct from, though not unrelated to, semicontinuity for
generalized set-valued functions and interval-valued functions like F.
In particular, semicontinuous real-valued functions may well be gappy
in a way that is precluded in 𝕀ℝ[0,1] or more general set-valued spaces.
17. An interesting question for further work is whether the Gcontinuity of 𝐹 = [𝑓, 𝑓]is equivalent to [((f ) being LSC) and (𝑓 being

USC)] or [(𝑓 being USC) and (𝑓 being LSC)], but not both
of 𝑓 and 𝑓 being one of LSC or USC.
18. I stress that it can be ignored only if P is continuous; it is not true
that the inequality holds only if P is continuous.
19. It would be an interesting project in itself to recast all of the
particular idiosyncratic details of the various competing probabilistic
accounts of causation in term of imprecise probabilities, including
reassessing each of the examples and arguments they employ.
20. Even when the temporal index is explicitly expressed as in (1) (as
opposed to placed out of sight within a “variables taking on values”
approach), as far as I can tell the temporal index is simply “carried
along,” that is, the continuity properties of chance as a function of
time are not addressed. I note too that as mentioned above, Menzies’
(1989) account does indirectly rule out the possibility of any (and
therefore any discontinuous) drops in chance, but at the cost of an
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implausibly strong monotonicity requirement, which in part leads him
to disavow the account altogether (Menzies 1996).
21. Of course the tradeoff with this move is that it would rule out
certain kinds of “gapless” functions, i.e., those that are LSC and not
USC. Recall Sect. 5.2.
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